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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Richard A. Larson appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing 
his untimely petition for post-conviction relief.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
In his underlying criminal case, the state charged Larson with, and a jury 
convicted him of, two counts of aggravated assault.  State v. Larson, Docket 
No. 40091, 2014 Opinion No. 64S at 1 (Idaho App. Nov. 3, 2014).  The Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed Larson’s convictions and sentences on November 3, 
2014.  Id.  The Remittitur in Larson’s direct appeal issued on February 24, 2015.  
(See Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“Notice”), filed May 16, 2016 (augmentation).)   
Larson filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief on May 2, 2016.  
(R., pp.3-32.)  Larson, however, signed his petition on February 16, 2016, and 
had it verified that same day.  (R., pp.31-32.)  Larson’s “Certificate of Mailing” 
also indicates that February 16, 2016, was the date he “deposited the original” of 
his petition “in the Prison Legal Mail System to be mailed VIA the U.S. Mail 
postage prepaid to the Clerk of the District Court,” with a copy to the prosecutor.  
(R., p.32.)     
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Larson’s petition on 
the grounds that the petition was not timely filed.  (See generally Notice.)  Larson 
filed a response to the court’s Notice in which he argued that, under the “mailbox 
rule,” his petition was timely filed, and that he mailed a second copy of his 
petition upon learning that the “original mailing of his petition for Post-Conviction 
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relief was never filed by the Bonner County Clerk.”  (R., pp.82-83 (capitalization 
original).)  Larson attached evidence in the form of exhibits to his response 
(R., pp.86-92), including an “ISCC Legal Mail Log” indicating two documents 
were received on February 16, 2016 – one addressed to “Bonner County 
Prosecuting Attorney, 127 S. First Avenue, Sandpoint, ID,” and one addressed to 
“Bonner County Courthouse, 127 S. First Avenue, Sandpoint, ID” (R., p.88).      
The district court entered an order dismissing Larson’s petition as 
untimely, and a Judgment of Dismissal.  (R., pp.93-97, 99.)  Larson filed a motion 
to reconsider, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.101-105, 108.)  Larson filed 
a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.  (R., pp.110-111.)        
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ISSUE 
 
 Larson states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Larson’s 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely because it 
erroneously found that the prison mailbox rule did not apply? 
  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.) 
 
  
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err in concluding that a prisoner is not entitled to the 
benefit of the mailbox rule when he addresses the envelope containing his post-
conviction petition to the correct court, but uses the prosecuting attorney’s 
address instead of the court’s address? 
 
4 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Dismissed Larson’s Petition As Untimely Based On Its 
Conclusion That Larson Was Not Entitled To The Benefit Of The “Mailbox Rule” 
Because Larson Used An Incorrect Street Address When Mailing His Petition To 
The Bonner County Courthouse 
 
A. Introduction 
  
Larson contends the district court erred in dismissing his post-conviction 
petition as untimely.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-10.)  More specifically, Larson 
argues that he was entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule” because he timely 
mailed his petition to the “Bonner County Courthouse,” albeit using an incorrect 
street address, and because he was diligent in resubmitting his petition once he 
discovered it was not filed.  (Id.)  The district court declined to apply the mailbox 
rule because “Larson put the wrong address on the petition that he delivered to 
prison officials,” and “[t]he Court never received that petition because it had the 
wrong address.”  (R., p.96.)         
  
B. Standard Of Review 
 
This Court freely reviews the district court’s application of the statute of 
limitation to a post-conviction petition.  Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 
177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 
836 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992)).  The interpretation of a statute is also a 
question of law subject to free review.  State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 
286 P.3d 537, 539 (2012).   
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C. The District Court Dismissed Larson’s Petition As Untimely After 
Concluding The “Mailbox Rule” Did Not Apply 
 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be 
commenced by filing a petition “any time within one (1) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later.”  The 
district court found that the Remittitur issued in Larson’s direct appeal on 
February 24, 2015.  (Notice, p.1.)  Larson, therefore, had until February 24, 2016, 
to file his post-conviction petition.  Although Larson signed his petition on 
February 16, 2016, and submitted it to prison officials for mailing that same day 
(R., pp.31-32), the petition was not filed with the court until May 2, 2016 (R., p.3), 
approximately two months after the statute of limitation expired.  As a result, the 
district court notified Larson of its intent to dismiss his petition as untimely.  
(Notice.)     
In response to the court’s Notice, Larson submitted documents 
demonstrating his efforts to timely file his petition, and asked the court to apply 
the mailbox rule.  (R., pp.82-92.)  Under the “mailbox rule,” a pro se inmate’s 
documents are deemed filed as of the date they are submitted to prison 
authorities for the purpose of mailing them to the court for filing.  Munson v. 
State, 128 Idaho 639, 642, 917 P.2d 796, 799 (1996).  Pro se inmates are 
generally entitled to the mailbox rule with respect to their post-conviction 
petitions.  Id. at 643, 917 P.2d at 800.  The rationale underlying the rule is that 
“pro se inmates los[e] control over their petitions once the petitions [are] 
delivered to prison officials, rather than when the petitions [are] voluntarily placed 
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in the United States mail or when the petitions [are] delivered to the court clerk.”  
Id.   
The district court concluded Larson was not entitled to application of the 
mailbox rule with respect to his post-conviction petition.  (R., pp.95-97.)  In 
reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the Court of Appeals’ 
unpublished opinion in Norman v. State, 2011 WL 11067211 (Idaho App. 
Dec. 23, 2011).  (R., pp.95-96.)  In Norman, the petitioner timely signed a notice 
of appeal following the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, but the notice 
was not timely filed.  2011 WL 1106722 *1.  The Court of Appeals declined to find 
Norman’s appeal timely under the mailbox rule because the failure to timely file 
the notice was attributable to Norman, not prison officials, since Norman did not 
properly address his notice of appeal for mailing.  Id. at *2.  The Court reasoned: 
The record indicates that Norman addressed his notice of appeal to 
the prosecuting attorney and the attorney general.  He did not 
address his notice of appeal to the clerk of the district court.  The 
notice was finally delivered to the clerk of the court by the 
prosecuting attorney, not by the prison mail system.  The mailbox 
rule does not apply in this case because the reason the notice was 
not delivered was that Norman failed to address it properly and not 
because some other factor, such as the prison mail system, 
interfered.  In addition, Norman has presented no evidence 
showing when he placed the notice of appeal into the prison mail 
system.  Therefore, Norman’s first notice of appeal was not timely 
filed with the clerk of the court. 
 
Norman at *2.       
Applying Norman, the district court stated: 
In this case, the prison mail log shows that the [sic] Larson 
put the wrong address on the petition that he delivered to prison 
officials on February 16, 2016, and that incorrectly addressed 
petition was mailed out by prison officials that same day.  The Court 
never received that petition because it had the wrong address.  
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Sometime later, Larson realized his error and caused a second 
copy of the petition to be mailed out on Wednesday, April 27, 2016 
(the date of the postmark), and this copy was received by the 
Court, and it was file-stamped on Monday, May 2, 2016. 
 
Accordingly, pursuant to Norman, supra, the mailbox rule 
does not apply in this case because the February 16, 2016, petition 
was not delivered to the Clerk because Larson failed to address it 
properly, and not because some other factor, such as the prison 
mail system, interfered.   
 
Therefore, Larson’s correctly addressed petition, mailed on 
April 27, 2016, and file-stamped by the Clerk on May 2, 2016, is 
untimely, and shall be dismissed.  
 
(R., pp.96-97.)  
On appeal, Larson contends “the district court erred in relying on an 
unpublished Idaho Court of Appeals decision.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)  While it is 
true that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent and are not binding 
except under limited circumstances, it was not erroneous for the district court to 
rely on a Court of Appeals’ decision for guidance.  See State v. Mann, 
2017 WL 1533655 *4 (Idaho April 28, 2017) (citations, quotations and brackets 
omitted) (“It is important to observe that the district court acted properly by 
applying the test adopted by the Court of Appeals . . ..  All tribunals inferior to the 
Court of Appeals are obligated to abide by decisions issued by the Court of 
Appeals.”).  Larson’s claim to the contrary fails.   
Larson next asserts that Norman is “distinguishable” and notes that 
“persuasive authority in other jurisdictions have [sic] held that the prison mailbox 
rule should protect those prisoners who are unable to file pleadings in person, 
and that protection logically extends to those who attempt to file a petition with 
the clerk of the district court.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)  As an initial matter, this 
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Court need not look to “persuasive authority in other jurisdictions” to conclude 
that the mailbox rule generally applies to incarcerated pro se inmates because 
that principle has already been adopted in Idaho.  Munson, supra; Hayes v. 
State, 143 Idaho 88, 91, 137 P.3d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Our courts 
therefore follow the ‘mailbox rule’ under which pro se inmates’ documents are 
considered to be filed when they are delivered to prison authorities for the 
purpose of mailing to the court clerk.”).  Thus, the only question is whether 
Larson was entitled to application of the mailbox rule in his case.  Larson 
contends he was entitled to the rule notwithstanding Norman because that “was 
a case in which the notice of appeal was mailed to the prosecutor’s office and not 
the clerk of the district court.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  It is unclear how this fact 
from Norman distinguishes it from Larson’s case because, although Larson 
addressed the mailing to “Bonner County Courthouse,” he used the prosecutor’s 
address.  (R., pp.88, 94.)  As a result, Larson, like Norman, mailed his petition “to 
the prosecutor’s office and not the clerk of the district court.”  The primary 
distinction between Larson’s case and Norman, therefore, appears to be that 
Larson thought he was sending his petition to the district court, but used the 
wrong 
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address,1 whereas Norman only sent his petition to the prosecutor and the Idaho 
Attorney General.2  The district court did not, however, find this distinction 
meaningful because the error was due to Larson’s failure, not “some other factor, 
such as the prison mail system.”  (R., p.96.)  Accordingly, the district court 
dismissed Larson’s petition as untimely.             
 
                                                 
1 Larson asserts that “[p]resumably, such a mistake in address is not uncommon 
and undoubtedly there is a process to forward county documents to the proper 
recipient,” as evidenced by the existence of a “COURTHOUSE MAIL” option on 
the court’s certificate of service.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  Larson’s use of the 
word “presumably” reveals there is no evidence in the record that there is a 
“process” for forwarding incorrectly addressed mail sent through the United 
States Postal Service.  Larson also suggests the “prosecutor who received such 
a pleading” had an obligation, “as an officer of the court,” to “take [ ] steps to 
ensure it reached the correct destination.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7 n.3.)  There is 
no evidence that any prosecutor personally “received” the petition Larson 
intended for the court and discarded it in bad faith, as Larson implies.  The more 
likely scenario is that someone other than a prosecutor opened all incoming mail 
and processed it accordingly without noticing the addressee on the label.  
Larson’s implication that there was misconduct is baseless.   
    
2 There are two additional differences between Norman and this case.  First, 
Norman “presented no evidence showing when he placed the notice of appeal 
into the prison mail system,” 2011 WL 11067211 *2, whereas Larson did present 
such evidence (R., p.88).  Second, Norman involved the failure to timely file a 
notice of appeal, which is generally a jurisdictional defect.  State v. Ciccone, 150 
Idaho 305, 306, 246 P.3d 958, 959 (2010) (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to challenge a decision made by a lower court.”); 
but see Hayes, 143 Idaho at 91, 137 P.3d at 478 (finding notice of appeal timely 
under mailbox rule).  On the other hand, the time for filing a post-conviction 
petition may be tolled under certain circumstances.  Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 
188, 190, 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).  Those 
circumstances are not, however, applicable to Larson’s case.  Id. (noting tolling 
has been recognized “where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state 
facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho 
legal materials” and “where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication 
renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing 
challenges to his conviction”).        
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CONCLUSION 
  
 This Court may affirm the district court’s order summarily dismissing 
Larson’s untimely petition for post-conviction relief.  
 DATED this 16th day of May, 2017. 
 
 
            
      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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